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THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: 




Conventional thinking assigns the Palestinian Authority (PA) an indispensable governing role in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The PA is also often described as a national achievement,
having enabled Palestinians to govern, for the first time, a Palestinian population over a Palestinian
land. The PA also supplies hundreds of thousands of Palestinians with employment through the public
sector. It is the international community’s preferred interlocutor – as opposed to the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). For Israel, the PA enables the maintenance of public order in the West Bank’s
major cities. 
While the PA still appears to be at the center of Palestinian politics, internally as well as externally, it
has brought few real changes to the way the West Bank is governed after 22 years of existence. In fact,
the PA’s governance function is virtually irrelevant. This weakness will play out on the political status
quo in ways that both policymakers and human rights advocates would do well to understand. 
What Changed in Governance post-Oslo (and What Didn’t)
The PA was established in 1994 as a result of the Oslo Accords. It was supposed to operate for a
maximum of five years, with final negotiations ostensibly succeeding by then. The Oslo Accords’
framework of governance has remained largely intact as peace negotiations have failed time and again.
This has allowed Israel to remain an occupying force exercising sovereign powers over the OPT, while
the PA has become the main provider of public services for the Palestinian population of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. 
Under the PA, municipalities and committees for refugee camps have continued to function as they did
prior to the PA’s establishment, and many have a longstanding history: Ramallah, for example, recently
commemorated its municipality’s centennial. Of course, the PA has introduced some new legislation
that affects local governance, including the election of members of municipality councils and the
establishment of a ministry for local governance. However, the structure of municipalities, the collection
of revenue, and the governance of civil servants in municipalities have retained their pre-PA
characteristics, keeping their dependence on central PA institutions minimal. Moreover, there has been
no local government structure coordinating between municipalities and the central authority, and there
have been no calls for change. 
The religious institutions of the West Bank’s various communities mainly govern family and personal
status laws. Different Christian sects use different personal status codes, and ecclesiastic courts
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govern these personal status issues without any jurisdiction of civil courts.1 Shari‘a courts for Muslims
are organized in a similar way in the West Bank.2 The establishment of the PA therefore did not
introduce new laws or change existing ones in this domain, and it did not alter the religious and
ecclesiastic courts’ structure and jurisdiction. As far as civil and criminal cases, Palestinian courts still
govern these in the West Bank based on the Ottoman Majallah and on Jordanian criminal law.3
Further, the PA has retained the use of military courts as adopted by the
PLO. The retention of these courts means that military laws are still
applicable to Palestinian subjects, and through state security, to civilians
as well. At the same time, Israeli military courts regulate Israel’s rule of its
controlled areas of the West Bank (such as military zones, natural reserve
areas, and Area C). Both Palestinian and Israeli military courts existed
before the creation of the PA and have functioned as usual during the PA
era. 
Though the PA introduced new laws that were meant to unify the judicial
systems of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in practice the systems have
maintained substantial differences – with the Hamas takeover of Gaza in
2007 intensifying those differences. The PA tried legal unification through central legislation. Although
the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) adopted most of these laws after the first elections of 1996, it
has been unable to convene since Hamas’ coup in Gaza in 2007. Since then, legislation has only been
effected by the PA president through decrees, and only in the West Bank. The PA president’s direct
control over executive offices has fostered a lack of accountability, especially because the president
also chairs the PLO Executive Committee. 
After 2007, Hamas started to issue its own legislation for the Gaza Strip and ruled through the
caretaker government headed by Ismail Haniyeh. The National Consensus Government agreed in June
2014 consisted of 17 technocrats under the presidency of Rami Hamdallah. Its period of work was
supposed to consist of no more than six months, and its main task was to prepare for the legislative
and presidential elections. However, the plan has not been realized, and this government is still in
place. It has been able to visit Gaza only once, without having, in reality, the ability to govern it.
Accordingly, legislative activity in the OPT carries on without a centralized legislative body.
The current PA government mainly deals with internal matters, while the president and his entourage –
without public consultation – take part in negotiations with Israel and handle the relationship with the
international community although this is a PLO role. Indeed, the PLO Executive Committee often does
not approve steps adopted by the president, such as the resumption of talks with Israel without a freeze
on settlement activities. 
All these examples illustrate a fundamental point: There is no real cohesive or smoothly functioning
Palestinian body politic in the OPT. The political space has remained fragmented, without unified
executive authority within the PA nor a defined system of government. The PA continues to depend on
individuals holding certain offices, specifically their ties with the international donor community that
supports the so-called peace process, and retains security cooperation and coordination with Israel. 
1 Asem Khalil, “Al-Mahakim Al-Kanasiyya fi Falastin,” Al-Qada' al-shara'i wa al-kanasi fi Falastin (Birzeit, Palestine: Institute of Law, 2012), 4-27. 
2 The same applies to the Gaza Strip. In East Jerusalem, laws correspond to those of the Jordanian authorities, as Jordan retained its ties to East Jerusalem after
the 1988 separation from the West Bank. For more, see Mahmoud Dodeen, “Taqrir hawla al-mahakim al-shar'iyya fi Falastin,” Al-Qada' al-shara'i wa al-kanasi fi
Falastin (Birzeit, Palestine: Institute of Law, 2012), 28-51.
3 The Gaza Strip, under Hamas, recently adopted a new civil code. Gaza’s criminal law is based on British Mandate criminal law. 
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Yet there is one area in which the PA has real influence: The security apparatus. This sector has
played a central role in the post-2007 PA structure, and much of the foreign aid from the US and
particularly the EU goes to the training of security forces. Most of the PA’s budget is dedicated to the
security forces as well as salaries of civilian PA officials; this has created a huge network of civil
servants and security forces that help keep the PA alive and allow it to maintain a minimum degree of
control over the population. The security apparatus is therefore necessary for the PA, and the PA is
necessary for the security apparatus it created.
However, the security and civil administrations of the PA are not unified. Internal systems are
disconnected, and information is rarely circulated among departments. In addition, the security forces
have a fragmented leadership, and report principally to the PA president rather than the PA Minister of
Interior or even the Council of Ministers. Reforms since 2003 have contributed to a sense of increased
order in PA cities, but not as a result of internal reorganization. Rather, coordination with Israeli
authorities, particularly on capacity building programs for security forces, has meant that Israel – until
the recent stabbings and related individual attacks carried out mainly by young Palestinians – has since
2007 rarely suffered from any serious violence. This resulted, until recently, in the easing of some
checkpoints and an increased number of permits for Palestinians to enter occupied East Jerusalem and
Israel (but not Gaza). 
The inflation in public employment through the PA has created a deep dependence, in both the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, on the maintenance of the PA, despite such problems as discrepancies in the
distribution of salaries and an inefficient use of human resources. This, coupled with the PA’s other
financial policies that have increased Palestinians’ economic dependence on it, makes it possible that
the disappearance of the PA would result in an economic and financial crisis. 
The PA in the West Bank has helped accelerate an economic boom in certain sectors, particularly
construction, which has resulted in higher land and housing prices. Ramallah, the political center of the
PA, has been fashioned into a space for the wealthy, whether those who are former owners of land,
contractors, or large companies, or those who are benefitting from deals resulting from the Oslo
Accords. These deals have helped to create monopolies among PA high ranking officials, especially in
relation to imported basic products. As such, a new economic elite overlaps with and shares interests
with the current political leadership. These developments also mean that what looks like an improved
economic situation is in fact one in which the gap between rich and poor is widening. Further, most of
the growth depends on loans, and prices do not reflect real value. 
Likely Scenarios for the PA’s Future: More (and More) of the Same  
The PA has not been governing the Gaza Strip since 2007. One can argue that it also has not been
governing the West Bank. The PA remains simply to maintain the security apparatus and civil
administration, and it will remain as long as it can preserve its co-dependent relationship with the
international donor community and with Israel’s security apparatus. 
The PA’s tenure will probably continue for the short and medium term, due to the likely perpetuation of
the status quo, which is in part dependent on the continued fragmentation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. This separation is not contingent on the divide between Fatah and Hamas, as it is older than the
2007 coup. It can be traced back to the West Bank and Gaza Strip that in 1948 fell under Jordanian
and Egyptian control, respectively. Israel’s policy in the OPT since 1967 has intensified this
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fragmentation, which will presumably continue even if reconciliation occurs due to deep-rooted social,
economic, and political differences. 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip rather than Fatah in the West Bank may be a less sustainable entity. Egypt’s
2013 regime change brought a president who is more sympathetic to the PA and is focused on cracking
down on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist movements more generally. This change in
circumstances indirectly benefits the PA and will in all probability help it to continue to survive. In
contrast, the change may help bring about the demise of Hamas. 
But even with Hamas remaining in power – and without an official
agreement between Hamas and Israel – it is more likely that a temporary
“solution” for the Gaza Strip could be reached. This kind of solution would
not be far away from the logic that was used to justify Ariel Sharon’s
withdrawal from Gaza in 2005. It would probably see only limited (though
possible) movement of goods and people to and from Gaza via secured
borders with Israel. Such an agreement could only be accomplished with
the support and guarantee of the Egyptian government and army, as
Israel has no control over the Rafah crossing – the only official passage
from Gaza to Egypt. This is one element of what would constitute a
situation of “status quo plus” – hereafter StatusQuo+.
The StatusQuo+ is the term I am using for a state of Palestine that is a non-sovereign entity and
completely dependent on the international donor community and Israel. This means that current Israeli
policies that aim to increase the areas under its control, and the creation of a dual system in the West
Bank – one for settlers and Israeli citizens, and the other for the local population – would intensify with
time. The PA would stay in charge of the local Palestinian population, without any authority vis-à-vis the
Israelis. Its coordination with Israel would be necessary to continue to keep the local population under
control. Such a system has all the necessary prerequisites to institutionalize apartheid.4
The PA would only serve as an intermediary to the Palestinian population under this apartheid regime.
It would not take the form of a centralized national authority, but would consist of a group of political
and economic elites as well as the security apparatus and civil administration, which could be termed
the “Palestinian Bureaucracy.” This group would become more complicit with time in regard to the
structure of West Bank apartheid. 
These political and economic elites would profit from ongoing privileges of the occupation authority.
Israel would continue to build new settlements, and the Separation Wall, which divides East Jerusalem
from the rest of the OPT and de facto annexes parts of the Palestinian territories beyond the Green
Line, would even further fragment the populated areas of the West Bank in order to incorporate most of
Israel’s settlements and the Jordan Valley. The Palestinian Bureaucracy, through profits from the newly
admitted “State of Palestine,” would in time likely be separated from the PLO (or from the agency
purporting to represent the Palestinian population of the Diaspora).  
StatusQuo+ would mean that the West Bank PA must look for sources for the extension of its
“sovereignty” outside of territorial continuity or the unified control of the population. The United Nations
General Assembly’s formal recognition of Palestine as a non-member state in 2012, as well as the
4 The author is aware of the differences between the former South African apartheid regime and the current Israeli occupation of Palestine. However, being
different from the South Africa example does not make the Palestinian case less of one of apartheid. In the absence of a more apt comparison, apartheid
continues to be the most similar experience to the one occurring in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.  
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ratification of international treaties, would serve to help accelerate the process of looking for post-
statehood scenarios, even before real statehood is achieved.5
The PA would need to increase cooperation with Jordanian authorities for this reason. Its aim to
increase ties with Jordan would likely include past plans, including the confederation option before real
statehood is achieved. Yet Jordan would presumably work to avoid an increase in its Palestinian
population.6 This situation could be a satisfactory one for both Israel and Jordan. Israel would continue
to control most of the West Bank without real resistance and with borders secured, while Jordan would
block any transfer of population and could start (or intensify) a denationalization process for some of its
own citizens of Palestinian origin, due to the establishment of a Palestinian state – however nominal.
This StatusQuo+ system would be unsustainable with the passing of time
because it would not satisfy the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-
determination. Many rightly believe that this future reality would lead to the
demise of the two-state solution. However, contrary to conventional
knowledge, the alternative would not be the one-state solution, but rather
t h e no-state solution. Such a “solution” would mean maintaining and
intensifying self-government authorities for the local Palestinian population
– but in domains proscribed by Israeli authorities. This would apply for the
West Bank as well as the Gaza Strip, although separately. It could even
apply separately to different West Bank regions. 
In the medium term, this no-state solution could lead to an (at least) three-state solution. Besides Israel,
which would maintain territory obtained in 1948, plus the expanded route of the Separation Wall,
Palestinians would establish a mini-state in the Gaza Strip. This state would be demilitarized and under
the protection and support of the Egyptian government. The third state would be established in the
West Bank, minus East Jerusalem. This state would have the appearance of an ethnically federal
structure: an area for settler Jews, and another for the local Palestinian population – but in reality it
would be an apartheid regime that with time would become a bi-national state. With more time it could
be incorporated into Israel proper, or perhaps take its own route and simply become a more and more
Jewish state.  
In case this bi-national/apartheid “state” remains separate from Israel, it would not be recognized by
states other than Israel. Israel would maintain a relationship with that state that is, mutatis mutandis,
similar to the way Turkey maintains ties to Turkish Cyprus. The (settler) “State of the West Bank” – or,
perhaps, “The State of Judea and Samaria” – would serve Israel by keeping its borders secured. The
very existence of a Palestinian population in that state would also help Israel to increase and ameliorate
ties with regional Arab countries, aiding Israel’s integration in the Middle East. Further, the state might
even help Israel to denationalize its own Palestinian citizens. Though these individuals would remain
within the state of Israel proper to avoid a reaction from the international community, which would not
look kindly on a forcible transfer of population, they would become citizens of this new bi-national state.
Denationalization in this sense would consist of a legal and political process through which Palestinians
would be excluded from the Israeli body politic – albeit short of physical displacement. 
5 In September 2011, the PA president requested full UN membership for Palestine. This requires recommendation from the UN Security Council by a majority of
nine out of 15 members, including the five permanent members, and a two-third majority vote in the UN General Assembly. The request was not successful, as
Palestine did not secure the necessary votes in the Security Council. See Michele K. Esposito, “Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: 16 August 2011–15 November
2011,” Journal of Palestine Studies 41, 2 (2012): 153-189. 
6 The king of Jordan, in a speech delivered in June 2012, said that any such discussion would be impossible until a complete independent state is established.
Parts of the speech were published in Journal of Palestine Studies 24, 96 (2013). 
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The Failure of the Two-State Solution and Revolutionary Possibilities 
There is no doubt that the two-state solution has failed. There are many reasons for this failure. For
one, the separation of the Gaza Strip from the rest of the OPT has become increasingly irreversible as
a result of Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 and the Hamas coup in 2007. The PA’s dependency on Israel as
the occupation authority is undeniable, and it has not been affected by the United Nations General
Assembly’s resolution that recognized Palestine as a non-member state. The West Bank has been
further fragmented by the construction of byroads for settlers, the building of new settlements and the
growth of existing ones, and the erection of the Separation Wall. All of these sobering developments
have rendered a two-state solution impossible. 
The one-state solution is not necessarily the only available alternative. The current status quo is indeed
a strong candidate for longevity, although with some changes that would lead to a StatusQuo+ system.
This may further lead in the medium term to the no-state solution for the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
which could progress to a three-state solution: one Palestinian, another Jewish, and another formally
bi-national or ethnically federal, but in reality a substantially updated apartheid regime with the elites of
the Palestinian Bureaucracy serving as interlocutors with the local population. 
The first two scenarios would likely lead to “stability” in the short and medium term, and the third
scenario would result in further fragmentation of the Palestinian body politic. Yet the stability that these
potential scenarios would bring is not real. It would only be the result of the domestication and
containment of the local population, and of the management of regional and international pressures.
Such arrangements are unsustainable in the long term as they are based on an illegitimate body using
force to control an unconsenting population. As history has shown, this kind of regime may stay in place
for a period of time, but it cannot last indefinitely.
Indeed, with time, and in the case of a more amenable regional and international atmosphere, a fourth
scenario – revolutionary in nature – may become the alternative to the current status quo, StatusQuo+,
and three-state solution. This revolutionary option is by definition unpredictable. Yet if – or when – it
happens, no one will be able to explain how the other options remained in place for so long.
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